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164 OX THE FORTS OF TO-DAY. 
eren in  peace time. We must look upon it ;LS furnidiing, too, the best oppor- 
tunity to the Officer of inferior p d e  and to the non-commissioned officer for 
showing what they are made of, and as thus strengthening the spirit of 
martial enterprise throughout the whole Army, and, owing to the intimate 
connection between Army and people, throughout the d io le  nation.” 
Colonel v. Boguslnn-ski concludes his remarks upon “ Der kleinc Krieg ” 
with tlie foregoing words. nf. Devaureix, d i o  is quite as niucli impressed with the importance of the 
subject as the  German writer, h,as not as yet given us his rien-s upon the 
training of partisans, which is to be regretted, as i t  n-odd Iiw-e been inte- 
resting to compare liis opinions nit11 those of Bopslnrcski. It is all the more 
disappointing as his last article in  the “ Journal des Sciences Xilitaires ” of 
December, 1880, concluded with the following u-ords :- 
‘‘ Apr& nvoir ex os6 toutes les considkrations qiii semblent militer aujoiir- 
cl’hui en fayeur de f? y e r r e  de partisans, il nous resterait b recherclier qi:elles 
doivent &re lcur organidion et leur Lictique de dEtail dam Pnvenir. h’ous 
reserverons cette double qiiestion pour line autre 6tncle.” 
Although Colonel v. Bopslawski mites, of course, specially for tlie German 
Armj-, and nlthougl?, much as Te  may admire German military institutions, 
we cannot Iielp feeling that there is n good den1 in them which is not appli- 
cable to our Senice, yet it appear; to me that there is nothing in his proposals 
as to  ‘‘Traininn for Partisan Warfare,” as far a t  any rate as I have quotetl 
them, which S g h t  not be carried out with advantage in the British Army 
or in that of any other nation.-L. G. 
ON THE PORTS OF TO-DAY. 
By BInjor E. 31. LLOTD, R.E. 
T ~ E  adoption of extended order, which is the most ninrked change in tactical 
formations during the present century, is the most marked change in fortificn- 
tion also. Jus t  as the thin veil of skirmishers has grown by depees into tlie 
fighting line of infantry, SO small advanced ~rorks liave gradually dereloped 
into detached forts, and become the true fighting line of n fortress. And just 
.?s military discussion is no longer concerned n-ith the appIicition of the 
oblique order, but n-it11 the handling of companies and battalions in the fight, 
so it 113s drifted m*ap from rival systems of fortifying an enceinte to the 
position and organizition of forts. The muse in botll cases is the same: 
increased effect of fire, and diminished apprehension of shock. 
It TJXS in  field fortification, \&ere there  as no Beat  inequality bctweeii 
the combatsnts, that continuous lines first went out of fashion. Successire 
improrements in small. arms, such as the introduction of the flintlock fusil, 
paper cirtridges, the iron ramrod, and the socket-bayonet, made infantry 
stand less in need of a material obstacle to protect them against horse, and 
allowed of handier formations and greater mobility. Troops on the defensive 
could not afford to leare the whole benefit of this to  their enemy, and restrict 
themselres to n passive defence. A t  Pnlton-a and Fontenoy the example was 
set of fortifying n position by n c h i n  of redoubts, giving freedom of counter- 
attack ; and the method rose in favour as time went 011 till its repiitation was 
estnblished by Torres Vedras and Dresden. I n  permanent fortifiation the 
movement in the same direction xu necessarily more cautious. Vauban n-as 



























ON THE FORTS O F  TO-DAS. 165 
tllo~gl:ll they delayed the besiegers for a fortnight in 1GD5. 3Tarsllal saxe 
instead of such redoubts, wished to surround a fortress by a chain of 111x0~4 
ton-ers. Xontnlembert combined the towers with the redoubts, and proposed 
to secure Cherhurg from bombardment by a double chain, of which tile 
outer n-orks were 2,000--3,030 yards from the pIace, and 1,400-2,000 ya& 
apart. But hi criticv confidently asked what was to  prevent a besieger from 
sapping round and isolating them; for even “when redoubts and lunettes, 
provided viith countermines and susceptible of a good defence, arc at the foot 
of the glacis of a besieged fortress, one docs not consider their communication 
with the place secure unless it is by an underground gallery.”’ Et-en such a 
gallery did not save the Queen’s Redoubt, in front of Fort St. Philip, ill 
Minorein, from being stormed in 1756, though it allowed the garrison to escape, 
to surrender with the fort next dayLy. The surprise of Schweidnitz in 1761 
incrensed the mistrust of outlying works. On the other hand, a t  Cxsel, in 
the following yenr, “ a  simple earthen redoubt, 1,000 yards from the fortress, 
obtained aU the honours of a regular siege. The besieger, after spending eleven 
days of battering and sapping upon this redoubt, a t  length ventured to ‘miult 
it ; the French, who were defending the redoubt, stood .the assault for more 
than an hour, and a t  length, with the help of reinforcements from the place, 
repulsed it with great loss to the enemy.’:* 
D ’ k ~ o n ,  afterwards a prominent figure among the French engineers, took 
pnrt as a 4-oung Oficer in the defence of C‘ssel, and Iaid its lesson to heart. 
In hk well-known work. Dublislied thirtv vex- Inter lip nrnrvrcorl fha n i i ~ ~ . -  
The Plate to Major Lloyd’s article on ‘‘ The Forts of To-day,” 
will be issued with the July Number of the Journal. 
, .__ - ~ - -  ---_- l.Y..”l.W “‘1 “ L l U  
morale of the garrison, &d the activity 6f the defence. Troops, as he said, 
were always apt to lose lie.& and think of surrender as they watched their 
enemy occupying cornanding points, tightening his grip round the fortress, 
establishing himself on the crest of the covered way, and opening a breach in 
the body of the place. Detached xorks, while hindering ench of these steps, 
m-ould also allow the men’s courage to be kept up by frequent sorties without 
risk of their retreat being cut off ;’and if these sorties \yere combined with a 
vigorous use of countermines the defence might be prolonged indefinitely. 
His Cnssel experience liad taught him the importance of keeps in the interior 
of detached Ivorks, and of good flank defence for their ditches ; and both of 
thesc are prorided-the former by a loopholed circular tower, the latter by a. 
countersmrp gallery-ill the excellent type of work known as the -‘lunette 
d’ArCon,”of which examples were to be found lately both at Uetz and Str- 
burg. 
The dehining value of detached n-orks v.?s exemplified in the t n o  British 
sieges of Badajoz. The first consisted mainly of an unsuccessful a thck on 
Fort San C r k t o d  ; in the second more than a week wm spent in the capture 
of the P i c u r h a  lunette. B u t  the siege of Colberg by the French in 1E07 
furnished n more strikhg insLince. Gneisenau, then only a Xajor, was sent 
there to dircct the defence. In  presence of the bcsiegers he t h e m  up a field- 
1 ‘‘ 318moircs sur 13 Fortification Perpcndicuhiie.” 
3 Op. cit. 



























OX TEE FORTS OF TO-DAS. 165 
t11ougli they delayed the besiegers for  a fortnight in 1G95. Marshal saxe, 
instead of such redoubts, wished to surround n fortress by a chain of m,uonry 
tom-em. Nontdembert combined the toxrers with the redoubts, and reposed 
to secure Cherhurg from bombardment by a double cliaiii, of wxich 
outer works were 2,000---3,000 yards from the place, and 1,400-2,000 yards 
apart. But his critics confidently asked what vx to prevent a besie er from 
mpppg round and isolating them ; for even “ when redoubts and Yunettes, 
provided with countermines and susceptible of 5 good defence, are a t  the foot 
of the glacis of n besieged fortress, oue does not consider their commuiimtion 
with the place secure unless it is by an underground gallery.”L Even such 5 
gallery did not mve the Queen’s Redoubt, in front of Port St. Philip, in  
Minorm, from being stormed in 1756, though it alloxed tlie garrison to escape, 
to surrender with the fort nest day. The surprise of Schweidnitz in  1761 
increased the mistrust of outlying works. On the otlicr hand, a t  Cassel, in 
the following year, “a simple earthen redoubt, 1,000 yards from the fortres.;, 
obtained all the lionoum of a regular siege. The besieger, after spending eleve11 
days of battering and sapping upon this redoubt, a t  length ventured to ns;2ult 
it  ; the French, who were defending the redoubt, stood .the assnult for more 
tlian an hour, and at length, with the help of reinforcements from the place, 
repulsed it with great loss to the enemy.”* 
D’Aqon, afterwards a pronkent  figure among the French engineers, took 
part as n young O!licer in the defence of Cnssel, and laid its lesson to heart. 
In his wAl-knomi work, published thirty years later, he proposed the ques- 
tion, “not merely whether detnched norks should be allowed as an addition, 
that seems evident enouvh ; but whether, supposing a simple enceinte is to be 
strengthened, one shoulg n o t  prefer these esterior dispositions to a multipli- 
cztion of works accumulated upon the eiiceii~te.”~ He Inid stress on their 
importance; as Nontalembert had done, for protecting n m d  men.& from 
bombardment, for which purpose they must be thrown formard a mile and a 
half or more. But he recommended them also for ordinary fortresses which 
would liave little to fear from bombardment, and where they need be only 
a b u t  a quarter of n mile from the covered imy. H e  built, not so much on 
the delay which their c q t u r e  would impose, a npon their influence on the 
morale of the garrison, and the activity of tlie defence. Troops, as lie said, 
were always apt to lose lienrt and think of surrender as they watched their 
enemy occupying commanding points, tightening his grip round the fortress, 
establishing himself on the crest of the covered way, and opening a breach in 
the body of the place. Detached works, while hindering each of these steps, 
.a-ould .also allow the men’s courage to be kept up by frequent sorties without 
risk of their retreat being cut off ;‘and if these sorties s e r e  combined n-it11 a 
vigorous use of counterniines the defence might be prolonged indefinitely. 
His Cassel esperieiice had taught him the importance of keeps in the interior 
of detached works, and of good flank defence for their ditches ; and both of 
these are provided-the former by a loopholed circulnr tom-er, the latter by P 
counterscarp gallery-in the excellent type of work knon-n ‘as the lunette 
d’bgon,”of -xhich examples were to be found lately both at Uetz and Strm- 
burg. 
The detnining raluc of detnched works w.as exemplified in the two British 
sieges of Badajoz. The first consisted mainly of an unsuccessful attack OR 
Fort SLm Criatoval ; in tlie second more than a week was spent in the capture 
of the Picurina lunette. But the siege of Colberg by the French in 1607 
furnished a more striking instance. Gneisenau, then only a Major, was sent 
there to direct the defence. In  presence of the besiegers he threw up n field- 
1 ‘‘ 3I&noircs sur In Fortification PerpendicukGre.” 
2 D’Arcon, ‘I Considerations Uilitnires et Politiques sup la Fortification.” 



























l C i G  OX TEE FORTS OF TO-DAY. 
Kork on-the WoKsbcrg, more than 1,000 p d s  in  front of the corered waj; 
t o  serve m the mnin pivot of an adranced line. Before it was finished it was 
stormed by the enemy, butgit .=-as recaptured before morning. The French 
then opened n systematic attack upon it, and after B siege of twenty-fire days 
thc work H - ~ S  surrendered, as it had been so much injured by that time that 
i t  ,was unfit to-stnnd ‘mother nssnult. - T h e e  days afterwards a sortie was 
~ ~ ~ ~ d c - a i i d  the garrkom once more got possession of i t ;  but it had to.be 
abandoned next morning, .after the gor c had been partially t1iron-n open. 
b o t l i e r  sortie four days later r a s  reputed mitli serious loss, and from that 
time the defence had to be more p.xsive ; but in another fortnight, while thc 
Jortress still held out, peace  as concluded. 
:-Tlie feebleness of small old-fashioned fortresses .as ordinarily defended, 
repeatedly illustrated throughout the Kapoleonic wars, had been brought out 
pntli special. prominence in 1614-16 ; and after Waterloo, n strong current 
.of opinion soon showed itself in  favour of fewer and larger fortresjcs. 
tRogniatrled the -say in 1816, with n proposd to eonr-ert places of strategic 
jmportance into intrenched camps cipable of receiving an army of 10O,Oc10 
!men by adcling four forts, one on each side of the place, a i d  a mile and a half 
,from it. , Four battle-fields would thus be presented to the enemy, each about 
three niiles long, perfectly secured on the flanks, and strengthened by Geld- 
vorks  in the centre. The problem of fortifying Park gave practical interest 
.to the. question, land after txenty years of controrcrsy betmen the ad\-ocates 
-of detached forts and those of n continuous enceinte, it x w  decided in 1630 
,to provide both. 
: , &feanwliile, in Germnny, this solution v.w more promptly and ur~animously 
arrived at. c The most iniportaut fortresses on the Rhine, Cologne, Coblentz, 
.Jhyencc, md Rrtstadt, n-ere converted into intrenched a m p s  by the help of 
:detached works, and tile same thing R-as done Kith Verona, Ulm, Olmutz, 
.Craco~~,  and! the places on the east frontier of Pruia ; while at Lintz ail 
lintrenched.camp was.formed by a chain of towers without any interior 
-cnceint e. 
I 3 T h e  clinracter of the German works and the principles on which they a c r e  
!planned aei-e explained in a memorandum by General con Brcse, the designer 
,of themarks of iYosen.l When n position is to be fortified, the engineer, he 
-.says,.mikes choice of. the most important points, and 011 thesc be places round 
.or anplxr.ton-ers, doruing casemated defensible barracks of two or three 
,stories, with n gun-platform on the top. Tliese towers, secure in  themselves 
.against a cozrp de main, are sheltered from direct artillery fire by earthen 
, m p n r t s  in front of them, %upon those sides on n-hie11 an enemy could place 
tbatteries. Thus they form the keeps of works, sweeping the interior with 
.musketry €ram their lawer story, and the tcrreplein of the ixmpru-ts with 
.artillcry from .their upper stoq-, wL1c the gun-platform on the top commands 
:tLe countrypzn camlier. ..The upper story can also be used for lionitzers to 
:~b& the siege-Irorks . The ditch in front of the earthen rampart is flanked by 
Laponiera or counteEcinrp casemates ; and, unless the work is exposed to fire 
.on dl sides; the-gorge i3 closed merely by n wall; so that other works in rcar 
may fire into it if i t  shodd be taken by the enemy. The Cologne n-orlis of 
.this type werc phced about a quarter of n mile in  front of the enceinte, aud 
m t h e r  more than that distnnce apart. 
e Arch& of such.works, General 1-011 B r k  argued, is not .only cheaper in 
construction, $amson, and nrmament, than n corresponding length of 
bastioned encemte, it opposes a resistance tllrec or four times ‘w pent, since 
-each n-ork must be taken separately, and above all it gires every facility and 
support to the offensiw strokes of the garrison. 
Ertrxcts from this mcmonndum were given in tho “ Royal Engineers’ -Aide- 



























0s TLiB FORTS OF TO-IlAS. 1G7 
As soon as rifled artillery N-~U introduced, i t  was seen that the g e n t  
increase of range and accuracy made detached w-orks a t  once more nccessry 
:uid more cffcctive than they I d  been hitherto, and they were employed 0l1 
quite a new scnle. I n  1859, immediately after the peace of Villafranca, 
Xrcronn m-‘w proi-icled 01% the west sick rritli an outer chain of forts, 2 miles 
i l l  advance of the enceinte, and rather more then 1 mile apart. The nev.. 
fortihitions of Antwcrp conipriscd n chain of forts mliicli were similarly 
placed, but were of much gretiter size, having n crest liiie of nearly half 
mile 011 the front and flanks, and an armament of 120 guns. 
I n  the English defence works undertaken a t  the same time, they played n 
still more prominent part. ‘‘ When the extent of the positions iicccssary to 
be occupied in order to protect the dockyards against long-range bombard- 
ment is considered, it is widently impossible,” it m-.u mid, “ to  occupy them 
by continuous lines, which must be manned throughout their whole extent, 
and which fall if pierced a t  aiiy one point.”’ Tlie forts in some cues had to 
be thrown forward 3 or 4 miles, so that they must needs depend wholly 
upon thcmsclves, without any support from an enceinte in rear. They 
were rather nearer toone another than the Antwerp forts, and had only about 
1i;tlf the length of crest line. While of the same gmeral type as the German 
forts, more care T T , ~  taken to place their caponiers in such positions that they 
\\-ere not liable to be silenced by fire along the ditches they ftankcd. 
In Engla~id, .as before in France, the new fashion of fortifying did not incct 
ivitii iuianinions appro\-aI, in spite of the fresh arguments in its favour. Just  
.w conserrative soldiers, even after the Fmnco-German war, still refused to 
admit that “our  two-deep line formation, so long regarded as n thoroughly 
British institution, must be looked upon henceforth ‘as inipracticable, and that 
the German skirmisher-srarni formation must take its place,” SO others 
ten year; earlier refused to admit “that mere fort building is fortificn- 
tion,” arid asked for I‘ a good wholesome wall and ditch xrliich the enemy 
has to get through or over before he reaches his object?’ A Fery able Ofliccr 
,-Colonel Oncn-tried to shorn that n continuous line, which “ has been well 
and fully tried for thousands of years,’’ is as cheap s n line of detached 
works ; that it mi be defended by f m e r  men and those men far lesn trained ; 
that its defciice is simpler and e.2sier understood by Generals, by Officers, and 
by men ; and that it appeals most to the patriotism of the citizens. 
But his vigorous argument failed to win much support, and in the discus- 
sion which he stnrted the weight of authority ~ v m  all agaimt him? It WRP 
Senerdly agreed that to guard a I-cry extended line with R smnll force, the 
cascntial thing was to make sure of the commanding points. If these were 
stroiigly fortitied and hcld, little \\-as to be feared from an enemy pushing 
beti-ieen them. Connecting lines ~ - o u l d  be of inore or l e s  value according to 
circumstniiccs ; but n simple continuous line of many miles would be as ill- 
adapted to pnseire defence by n mixed garrison as to active defence by an 
army of disciplined troop;. A s  regards the relative expense, there r a s  the 
broad fact that the enceinte of Paris, though of the simplest kind, n-ithout 
outworks and with an unrevetted counterscnrp, had cost 25 per cent. more 
tlia!i the chain of forts, the perimeter of which was more than half .as much 
,?gain. 
The real gist of the question is d l  brought out by one of Colonel Owen’> 
illustratiois. “ When n farmer puts up n fence or% wall round his garden, IIC 
erects n fortificntiori ; and so long as fortifimtion is n development of that one 
simple idea, everyone Gin understand it. When you put 111) A row of forts 
f, I‘ Royal Enginccr €’rofcs~ional Papcr3;’ rol. ix. - “Royal En:ineer l’rofcssionnl Papers,” rols. xii oud xiii. Another ntlrocntc (If 
continuo& line; has lately comc f o r k d ,  but only t o  follon- in Colo?el Oaen’a 



























168 ON THE FORTS OF TO-DAY. 
and my the enemy oznnot pLw through, it is asking tlie farmer to believe that  
the posts of his fence will keep out cattle without the mils.” But the 
parallel shows how completely the engineer may lose sight of tlie tactician. 
The fence has to keep out tlie cattle by itself ; but i t  is not the works, but 
the troops inside of them, t lu t  nil1 have to keep out flie enemy. The question 
is, how they will be best posted for that purpose : in n long thin line, or in 
compact groups 1 The armour must be made tbfit the man, not the man the 
armour. 
Colonel Owen took exception, not only to the open intervals, but .to the  
closed gorges of the forts. He confidently asked whether, supposing an 
engineer had the time and nienm to strengthen further a place already 
fortxed by a continuous line, he would intrench tlie salient points inwards, 
or in  other words, coavert them into forts. “ Surely not,” lie said, “ \rould lie 
not rather xmke eoupures in his o m  rampart, and retrench against the cnemy 
those points most liable to be breaclied, or where from exceptional circum- 
stances an escalade might be apprehended ?’ The course of tlie Aniericm 
Civil War xras just a t  that rery time t1iro.n-ing some linht on this point. 
General Abbott, of the United States Engineem, in 117s remarks on the 
operations aminst Richmond, dwclh particularly on the advantage derived 
from insulnt%ig tlie i-ital points of tlie line. ‘‘our systcm of intrenclirnents 
at Petersburg,” lie says, “consisted in general terms of n sj-stem of field- 
works, each capable of containing n battery of artillery, and a strong infantry 
g,mison. orge, nere protected with abnttis 
and palisnding, were often supplied nitli tomb-proofs, and were located at 
intervals of about GOO yards, on such ground as to well sn-eep the line in front 
with artillery fire. They were connected by strong continuous infantry 
parapets, viith obshcles in front.” Early one morning, three Confederate 
divisions swept across the lines on either side of one of the weakest forts, 
joined in renr, and cnrried it ; but they could take no others. As soon as 
ilayliglit n-ould permit, all the artillery that could be concentrated opened on 
the work which had been Lzken, and n-liich the cnemy still held. “No 
reinforcements could join him froin his own lines, owing to this fire which 
swept his communications ; his apturcd position w.u entailing deadly loss ; 
our reserves were rapidly assembling, and finally, about 8 A.M., they made n 
charge which resulted in the recovery of our u-orks, of all our artillery, and in 
tlie cipture of over 1,600 prisoners.”’ The result was very different in some 
of the assnults upon the Confederate lines, ix-liere the works had open gorges, 
and such an extent of linf: was consequentIy occupied, that the ‘xsdants 
could not be driven out again. 
What applies to field-works applies equally to permment or proiisioiial 
works. German engineers, from Von BrCse to the present day, have laid i t  
down that in  most cases ‘an enceinte will be best formed by placing works of 
the Snme general type ,as detached n-orks upon the most iniportant points, a i d  
connecting them witli one anotlier by simple lines ; and this was the mode 
adopted in the bridge-head of Florisdorf, thrown up in 1866, to protect 
Vienna. 
The varied siege experience of the Franco-German War brought out fresh 
rc,asons for extending the circle of defence of fortresses, both large and small, 
.and consequently for relying more upon forts. The blockade OF n fortified 
cqital, like Paris, proved by no means so n s t  an undertaking xs 1i:d been 
predictcd. Instead of requiring five or s is  times the strength of tlic garrison, 
as CoIonel Brialniont, for instance, lint1 estimated, it was found that a 
garrison of 200,000 rcgulars and mobiles (besides national guards) could be 
secnrelyinvested by an arniy actually inferior to it in numbers, extended over 
a circuit of nearly 60 miles. 
These works were closed a t  the 



























OX T I E  FORTS OF TO-DIT. 1 GD 
The chief object of the new fortificntions of Paris is to make such an opcra. 
tion more difricult in future by robbing the enemy of those commanding sites 
which proved so useful to l b ,  doubling the length of his line of ‘investment, 
and cmbracing large arc,zs of czmping ground and pasture. There xre three 
principal masses of high ground, upon the north, tlic east, and the south-west 
of Paris. Possession of these masses is now secured by the new forts which 
form tlircc scpante qmps, “three LictiLil centres,” a i d  are from G to 10 miles 
in advance of the enceinte. Horn far more formidable a work another siege 
of Paris would be, is fully recognized by the Gerinans themselves. A receut 
writer in the “ Xilitair Woclicnblatt ” (August, 16SO) points out all the 
diEculties of the task : from the extension of the works, their advantages of 
position, their excellent construction, and pon-erful armament, the circular 
railwajs which “ give the Comhander-in-Chief n freedom of action without x 
parallel in military history: a d  the immense resources of the city. ‘ I  One 
cinnot expect that, ,as in 1670, the French armies will disippear from the 
scene, but must rather ,assunie that there will be time enougli fora large army 
to be collected for the defence of Park,” especially when we consider the 
spider’s-web charactcr of tlie French railway network. Wliile a continuous 
in\-estment would be a gigantic task, lie thinks i t  rery questionable wheth~r, 
.as h,w been proposed, an effective blockade could be maintained by arniies 
concentrated on different sides, and linked to one another by a d r y  divisions. 
But “ the defence of this vastcst of all fortresses must be planned and 
executed upon n grand scde, and requires niilitary genius of the highcst 
order,” and the doubt whether this would be forthcoming is the chief con- 
solation n-hicli the n-riter offers to his countrymen. But, as the same m i t e r  
adds, “it is not only round Paris that the obsen-ant Geinlan soIdier sees the 
circle of dcfcncc growing wider and stronger ; besides tlic new intrenched 
Limps of Epinal and Belfort, Langres, and BesinSon, the lines of La E r e ,  
the fortified position of Rlieinis, tlie fortresses of Verdun and Toul, girdled 
with strong new forts, tlie fortified plateau of Haj-e, the permanent works 
which guard the Moselle near Nancy, and tliose.whic1i lie on tlie Alcusc, upon 
tlie north-east frontier, the entry of an enemy in another direction is opposed 
by the intrenched cimp of Dijon in the CGte #Or, and by that of Lyons 
further south. I f  tlie above-mentioned \x-orks of defence and lines are only 
in part new creations, yet it is solely by the extension tliey have rcceived, 
their solid coilstruction and suitable armament, that tliey have become factors 
full of imporhiice, which must be taken account of in those l q e  cilctilations 
on which hangs the weal or woe of nations. One stands amazed when one 
considers t h t  that same France which lay so low in 1871 is now able to 0111 
out much more than n million of men to defend their cpuntry, and that dl 
the above-mentioned mesures of defence have been cirried out, with rl. 
silence quite unlike the Frcnch wont, and are nom nearly finished.” 
What chiefly concerns us liere in these defences is to notice the almost com- 
plete disappearance of those small fortresses for about 5,000 men, v-liich, froni 
Vauban’s time don-n to 1670, stood like picquets extentled along tlie French 
frontier. Instead of them we see a series of Limp-fortresses’ with barrier- 
forts betn-ccn them. i\Iontm&ly is to be reduced, it is snid, to the latter 
class ; while Toul, Langres, and Verdun ha\-e been conrerted into camp- 
fortresses of ten times their former diameter. Toul proved very useful in 
1670, blocking n main line of rail\\-ay for s i r  weeks, owing to the German 
inability to bring up n siege-train a t  that titne ; but, like Verdnn, Thionville, 
and so many other places, it  surrendered without n-aiting to be regularly 
besieged. The convergencc of fire from all quarters, to wliich their sniall 
1 The Austrian term “ camp-fortress” seems preferable to the German term 
One can speak of the component parts n~camp-forts, instcad of ns “ fort-fortress." 
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radius exposed tliem, ni;ide defence Iiopeless. Tlie long and snccssful resist. 
ante of Belfort \ms niainly due to the bold ninintenaiice of outlying positions. 
Apart from the rcasons that lmvc been given alrcady, the fa\-ouring of all 
actis-e defence, the occupation of 1-aluable sites, the protection of buildin3 
froiri bombaidment, and the enhancement of the difficulty of blockade ; 
looking merely to the conditions of tlie artillery combat, rifled y n s  hale 
made i t  all-important to enlarge the circle of defence, so as at any rate to  
escape reverse fire. 
In sonic cases, as at h h r e r p  and S t r a s h r g ,  tlie nature of the ground ir 
likely to forbid coniplete envelopment, and there may be fair hope of reaping 
the full ~ a l u e  of n strong enceinte by an obstinate defence at close quarters ; 
but  elsewhere, though it may he well to h a w  sonic continuous obstacle to bar 
entry into the tomi which’ forms the lieart of n fortress, it may be doubted 
xrlietlier it l-iill be found worth vhile in future to create a siege-enceinte. 
I V h t  used to be said of the covered ~ray-“eovered n-ny lost, all is lost”- 
niny non- be said v i th  cqunl truth of the line of forts. That is the line 
whicli i t  is the most essential and easiest to defend, and nearly all tlie avail. 
able resources should, therefore, go to reinforce it. The iden of the Prussiail 
engineers of the last generation, that n fortress, like :I spiral spring, should 
offer more resistance the more it is colnpesijed, must be disciirded as Iiopeles, 
i n  presence of rifled artillery. 
Sonic nucleus (~ioynu) is certainly desirable for ewq-  large fortress, but this 
may be not in its centre, but on its border line, like the citadels of fornier 
days ; sonic particular region of niarked iiatural strength or importance being 
cowtituted zs an indcpenderit camp, defensible on all sides. The sninll cimp 
fiist formed at Langres may bc said to stnnd in  this relation to the rnucli 
Inrgerciimp since fornied by the new forts to tlie north and east, t\ro of wliich 
.are 7 niiles from the place. 
Genernl Brinlmont goes furtlier. H e  recommends tliat the plan of grouped 
camps nhieh has been actually adopted at Pnris should be the normal disposi- 
tion for tlie fortificiition of n cipital. He gives &as n type three similar campi 
symmetricdly placed on a belt n w l y  G miles nide, and lying at about tlic 
sdme distance outside the city. Each camp n-ould be roughly about 14 
iniles by G ,  and might be formed by ten forts-five upon the front, three on 
tlic gorge (tomrds tlie city), arid one at  each end. TIE intcrrals betvieen the 
cimps would be about 0 miles. He consideiv that though the cost \rould 
be genter  than that of n siniplc line of foi-ts, tlie ,defence would be much 
more protizcted, and there ~rould no longer be any necessity for a guard- 
enceinte round tlie apital, n tliiiig most important to avoid with n v,s t  and 
SoKing city like London. 
“There is a bold and tacticd air a b u t  this method of fortifjqng ; holding 
the cueniy off by threatening his flanks instcad of ban-ing.liis front. It looks 
at first sight like n larger application of tlie principles xhich liarc substituted 
detached works for continuous lines. But there is tlie all-important distinc- 
tion that such works arc assumed to be xdhin range of each other, and tlint 
these a m p s  w e  not. The combat is to be one of weeks and not of hours, so 
t ha t  the cuemy can afford to push his way form-ard cmtiously in  the interval3 
upon a front of G miles, intrenching himself against flank attacks. Once 
within range of the ctpital it  must fall into his hands, for any shorn of resist- 
ance would bring bombardment upon it. Tlie defending army, if the war is 
not ended, \rill find itself cut in three, and its camps nil1 be open to attack 
an whiclierer side the enemy may prefer. It may be said that the i n t e n d s  
would be occupied by field-works ; but the comparative inadequacy of field- 
Trorks, n-hicli is tlie ground for all permanent fortificntion, applies here as 
much as ekemhere. No doubt, with so extensive n circuit i t  would be x-ell 
worth while to retrench some one part to serve ‘2s n citadel ; but leal-ing one 



























OS TIIE FORTS OF TO-DAY. 171 
ilalf--dozen works rrliicli gurd tlie rear of the other two camps n-ould be better 
p l a c ~ ~ l  by pails in the intervals.” 1 
nowever well such a disposition may apply in  a pnrticnlar instance, such as 
r,u.is, where there was not only a n  cnceinte for the city, but gorge forts for 
tile c,smps ready to hand, it seems very questionable as n general type. As 
&ialmOnt himself points out in  another connection :-“ The action of n fort 
011 the ground in  front of the neighbouring forts \rill be greatest where tile 
forts are in a straight line, or in one that is very slightly convex. One should 
a\-oid as mucli ‘a2 possible, therefore, plxing the forts in such a yay as to form 
.proIiounced salients and re-entering angles.” 
Ri t l i  the csce tion of the viorks at Paris, the forts lately built have, as 3. 
by Brunner’ and B?i:~lmont~ that this distance should be increased to 4: miles, 
ill order absolutely to preclude bombardment of tlie tonn. But the increase 
in cost of construction, and in the strength of garrison, inrolred by such an 
extension of radius lins to be set agaimt this advautage. N s o ,  as tlie distance 
  dens, tlie ~ . e a  oqntervcning ground unseen from either forts or enccinte, 
and affording slielter4o an enemy who iins p ~ ~ s e d  between the forts, will 
beconic greater ; in one of the new French fortresses there is said to be more 
illan n sq1xu-e mile of sucli ground. Such an advance n-ill sometimes be nee&- 
stry, however, in  order to see the ground in front better, as OIL the south-east 
side of-TuTeiduii (vhicli is probably the fortress just referred to), where one of the 
principal forts is more than 4 miles from the enceinte; and occxiionally it may 
even reduce the length of line to be defended, as in  the Aithony position a t  
Devonport. 
* It is beginning to be accepted as a principle tliat the distance of forts from 
one another, instead of 1 or 1$ mile, may be 2.  or  3 miles, if the vound  is 
open; in other irords, tliat it is enough for them to defend the’intcrvab 
between them, instead of affording etfective mutual support. This Ins 
.been acted upon in many of the new fortresses, especially in E’mnce. Betrreen 
the St. Cyr and Palaiseau Forts (on the south-vest of Paris), d i i c h  are more 
dim I0 miles apzrt, it lins been thought sufficient to provide two others. The 
country round Verdun is broken and wooded, and there eleven \wrks ha\-e 
been made for n perimeter of 25 miles, the inten-ah varying from 13 to 
3 miles. . One reason given for this nide spacing is to economize garrisons, and 
to nroid breaking up tlie defence into many fractions. Bu t  the duty of 
guarding intervals of 3 miles could not fail to be made lighter by the esist- 
ence of storm-proof posts in  the middle of them ; nncl the writers wlio give 
their sanction to such long intervals ( e g . ,  Brialniont, Brunner, Von Bonin) 
,assume some such small intermediate n-orks, either permanent or provisional. ‘‘ It i3 well knom,” szys a French engineer; “ that in the fortresses as they 
’now sLznd, h t l i  in France and abroad, the extent of the works has been 
limited by financial considerations; and, therefore, in most cases only the 
most im ortnnt points round tlie fortress haye been fortified, and the comple- 
tion of t1e defences lias been postponed till the time of need. . . . The 
Germans lzave placed the forts t l i r o ~ n  up round Strssburgj  and Uetz a t  
overage intervals of 2 to 4 kilorn&-es, as they consider those plnccs to be too 
inuch in front line to allow the making of intermedizte works to be put off 
till war breaks out : on the other hand, for the forts of their pLzces in second 
line they hnve been satisfied with the interv‘& of 5 or G kilom2tres adopted 
*rnIe, been .place( P within 3 miles of the enceinte. It has been recommended 
“ R o p l  Engineers' Journal,” March, 16i4. 
“ DSfense dc3 Etat3,” (187G), pp. 141, 143. 
3 “Bestindigc Bcfcstigung,” (18iG)? p. 151. 
4 “Ztudc cur Is ~ortification semi-permancntc.” Par un OfGcicr du GC6nie. 
Strassburg has fomtecn forts ; those on the south and enst are 4 kilomktrcs, but 
(ISSO.) 



























172 OX TIIE FORTS OF TO-DAY. 
in  France. This shows that they mean to throw up intermediate aorks there 
when needed, and that they admit the principle of mutual flanking a t  effective 
ranges, n principle which is equally admitted in France.” 
The projects for such intermediate works have, according to this writer, 
been already got out, but he estimates that 500 or GOO men would be occupied 
two or t h e e  nionths in  making one, and rensonably urges, therefore, that 
France should follow the example of Germany, and build tlTm in time of 
peace for  her frontier fortresses. 
But if it is desirable that they should be permanent works, one may further 
nsk whether the maxim does not hold good liere as elsewhere, that “a  cllain 
is no stronger tlian its WL?kCSt link,” a i d  whether-apart from peculiarities 
of site, n-hich nil1 continually give more inipoitance to this fort, and less to 
that-it sliould not be the general rule to equalize the several links, instend of 
making them weak and strong alternately. “The garrison of n large fort 
consisting of 1,500,to 1,800 men, commanded by a Colonel, will usually have 
a better spirit and be more ably hndled tlian that of n small fort consisting 
of 303 to 400 m&, commanded by a Captain or n Major.” 1 On this ground 
General Bi-ialnidnt lixs dwnys bccn the advocate of large forts, and prefers 
to  iwhicc their number rather than their size; but whatever weight thk  
argument may ha\-e against small forts, i t  must have much more weight 
against the still smaller intermediate works (intended for 50 or GO infantry 
nnd 3 or 4 light guns, according to General yon Bonin), which it is proposed 
to place in the vide intervals between the forts. The French enginccrs lean 
to  Brialmont’s views. The principal forts of their ncw Limp-fortresses have 
infantry garrisons of 1,000 men and mount 3G piis on the ramparts Some 
of the Paris forts mount GO guns, while some of the isolated barrier forts 
mount from SO to 100, and are constructed for 2,000 men or more. The 
Gernian engineem lay less stress on size. Tlicy arc sntisfied in most w c s  
with infantry garrisons of 500 men, and with 20 guns on the ramparts. When 
morc y n s  are needed a t  any particular point, they can be placed in wing 
batteries, without enlarging tlie forts. If the Germans are ridit, forts may 
be place(1 at n mile and a - h a  apart without absorbing more t L n  one-third 
of tlie entire garrison of the fortress, reckoning this, ,as is generally the w e ,  
at about 1,000 infantry per mile. 
Pc2ssing now to the construction and organization of individual forts, it 
will be best first of all to borrow a general description of one of the new 
German forts: such ‘as those of Strassburg, to serve .as n point of depnrture 
and comparison for others. 
“ The detached forts of the chain round n p m t  place of aims are usually of 
lunette shape with very obtuse snlients (130” to 145”), in order that the faces 
may escipe enfilade, and also that their frontd actiofi may be better, since 
they have to hold their own against tlie besiegers’ batteries in  the first 
encounter. The direction of the flanks depcnds on the position of the colla- 
teral works, but is, as a rule, nearly parallel to the mpital. Assuming the 
forts to be n long way from the enceinte, their gorges may be closed by a line 
of rampnrt either of bnstioned or of slightly re-entering trace. 
“The size of the forts is proportioned to the part they have to play in  the 
geneid system of defence. The faces will commonly be 75 to 125 m;tres, the 
flanks 50 to 5G m?tres in length, so that the perimetcr of the forts will con- 
siderably exceed m-liat it  used to be, just as their present importance does. 
‘‘ In n detached fort tlic use of the covered way is not so much to facilitnte 
sorties, which cin be made more conreniently upon tlic flanks, as to allow of 
keeping sentries outside the work up to the last stage of tlic defence; it cm 
be rcplaccd, therefore, by n simple patrol path, mliich on the gorge side 
“DGfensc des Etnts,” 1’. 143. 
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”ecomes a, roadway to tlie wing batteries (diwchlusu-glacis), and widens out 
opposite the gorge Giteway into n place of ?rm, with a tanibour and a block- 
liouse to y a r d  the comiuunimtion. By this arrangement of the corered way, 
together with admissible reduction in tlie width of the ditch, it  becomes pos- 
sible to screen the nxasonry csmrp of the faces and flanks from the besiegers’ 
int1irect fire, provided it is limited to a height of about 5 metres. Since this 
IlejgIlt in itself affords no sufficient security against assault, and tlie situatioil 
of the forts-usuallpon commanding ground-seldom allows of wet ditches, 
sllcll security must be souglit for by means of good flank defence for the 
{1itcIles, and of a high revetted counterscarp, perhaps organized for counter- 
mines, The csczrp of tlie gorge, not being esposed to the heavy batteries of 
t1:e attack, will be utilized for shelter-oasemates, and revetted to a suitabIe 
Ilejglit. - 
[[The double cziponiers at the shoulders which were formerIy used to flank 
tile ditclics of lunettes are no longer admisible, 3s they could be destroyed 
by the enemy’s indirect fire on the prolongation of the ditches of the faces. 
Tliey are usually replaced by a aponier at the salient, sweeping the ditches 
of tlie faces\witli artillery, and two single mponiers at the shoulders, on the 
prolongation of the escarp of the faces, sweeping the shorter flanks with 
musketry. If the gorge has been iven n bastioned trace, msemated flanks 
fnrnisli a low flank-defence for its k‘itcli ; if it  ~ i a s  been simply broken inward, 
3. caponier is required. All aponiers have posterns leading to them from the 
interior of tlie fort. 
“The old reason for  providing the esarp nit11 n costly revetment TTRII, to 
bring the musketry fire as near 3s niight be to the crest of the glacis, has no 
longer any weight with the new rifle ; it is now thought better, therefore, for 
the mke of economy, to Lave an enrthen slope for the eswrp of the ranipart 
of tlie faces md flanks, and to lace a less substantial detached wall a t  the 
“The command to be dven  to the rampart above the plane of site depends 
q’on the formation of tlie grouud in front, which should be 0%-erlooked ‘as 
extensively The 
greater penetration of the iiew siege guns requires that the thiclines of 
the parapet should be increased to about 7 m2tres. A less command nil1 
suficc for the gorge parapet ; it i3 enougli that i t  should corer the faces and 
flanks from reverse fire in case of assaults; and here, as the direct fire of 
Iienvy siege g ins  has not to be met, the thickness of the puxpet may be 
reduced to 4 mstres. 
‘:The rampart will from the first be organized for gum upon the faces and 
flanks. On the gorge it will be prepared only for musketry, but in the later 
stages of tlie defence i t  may be necessary to mount y n s  there  also ; and 
accordingly the teireplein must be made wide enougli for them. . . . . 
“The employment of memated bntteries for fire to  the front lins had to be 
gii-en up ; the bombproof gun-em lacenients of m‘asonry or timber wliicli 
viere fornierly in use, can be useS no longer, owing to t ~ i e  accuracy and 
destructiveness of the xiem siege artillery; it has been found necessiry to 
sncrifice tlie lion-itzer fire upon the country which w‘w to be f u n d i e d  by tlie 
upper stories of msemated keeps, since such action of the k e e p  could not be 
reconciled xVitli their ova  protection from indirect fire. But this protection 
has further required in most oises that the command of the interior of the 
work froni the csemated keep should also be sacrificed, since if i t  n-as to fnlfil 
its object in this respect it could not be shielded against an angle of descent 
of 10”. There was natunUy great reluctance to abandon the casemated 
defences which had been thought so much of, and attempts were made to 
reinforce them by iron plating, as liad been successfully done with ships-of- 
war. But the results of these attempts xrere not very &&factory. The con- 
clusion has Iiad to be accepted that casemated defences are only to be 
foot of it ‘2s the obstacle to .xwiu P t. 
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employed where, oving to tlie nature of {lie site, they can be protected evel, 
from indirect fire. . . . . 
" Tlie importance of the iampart as the main line of defence has become 
more distinctly marked, and has demanded better measurcs for securing its 
defensive powers. With this object the gun emplacements and roadu-axs 
along the ramparts hare been sunk lower, in order to get better cover ; higher 
cnniages have been adopted for the guns firing overbank to repel assaults ; 
wliile indirect fire is chiefly contemplated from those nliich are intentled for 
the artillery combat in case of n regular siege, since the deep einbrsures that 
Iiam been used Iiitliei-to cannot now be employed, on account of the accuracy 
of the new artillery. Blore complete traverse-corer lias been given to p " r d  
?gainst side shots ; only one gun being placed betrreen a pair of t1.n-i-eiscs 01) 
lines exposed to enfilade, and on other lines at most two guns. Secure 
receptacles for ammunition for immediate use Iiave been made in tlic interior 
slol-e, or i n  the trai-erscs ; and the latter, being built hollow, with a sufliciellt 
thickness of e.artli 01-er the masonry on tlie enem3-k side, allon- the troops 011 
duty upon the ramparts, and even some of the lighter pins  provided against 
an nsfi,2ult, to  take shelter in  them i f  the enemy's firc should be vei-y lien\-. 
" The quarters for the prrison i n  general lie as n rule in n range of case- 
mates dong the gorge, which also contains the hospitals (essential for the self- 
dependence of the several forts), and in  the b,xement, kitchens, stores, &. 
For y a r d s  and other detachments held in readiness, casemates open to the 
rcar and =-ell prorided wit11 outlets are niade under the terreplein of the 
faces ; in case of nced the space afforded by the posterns will either supple- 
ment these or serve instead of them. This space will ako be snfficient to 
contain some of the stores n-hich are not immediately required for the defence, 
and nhicli ought to  be sheltered from the enemy% fire. . . . . 
'' Each fort rcquircs a t  least one main powder-magazine, completely in tlic 
heart of tlic rampart, and quite out of reach of the enemy's fire, and, accord- 
ing to its size, two or t h e e  shell-filling rooins, each nitli its own expense- 
magazine and the necessary storerooms for  the several kinds of artillery 
ammunition. . . . . These are placed under the terrepleins, and ape 
connected by lifts nit11 hollow traverses overhead, SO that the made-up 
ammunition cin be transported without risk from the enem$s fire almost to 
the very spot where it is to be used. Lastly, the increased effect of siege 
artillery imposes greater cnre about the communications. This is partly met 
by  the larger use of traverses on the terrepleins; but nit11 . . . . 
detached works one cannot do without large wpitnl, or central, trareises, 
wliicli diride the interior of the work into sep'zratc portions, protect the  
several lines of rampart from indirect reverse fire, and at-the same time a110\~ 
n completely sheltered communication to be made between tlie gorge and the 
cisemates under the main rampart. With yery exposed works one may eren 
go so far as to carry this covered communicntion riglit along the ramparts, 
:md connect it by staircises +tIi the hollon- trarerses on tlie terrepleiii, so 
that if the enemy's fire is 1 i ~ ~ x - y  and conrergent the open area of the work 
and the ramps to the terreplein need iiot be nsed a t  all for circulation." 
M u c h  of the above description rrould apply to any of the recently con- 
structed forts, whether in Germany or elsewhere. Tlie points which chiefly 
call for remark, and regarding ~ I i i c h  we find most cliIferericc of treatment, 
are :- 
. . . .  
(a) The general shape of tlie fort, 
(a,) Tlie prorision of n keep, 
(c.) The disposition of tlie rampart armament and the mode of niount- 
(d.) The cnponiers. 
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llas preferred a sin& straight front, or Iiend, to tlic tivo faces of tlic ii1oTc 
llsual lunette form. IIis objection to tlie latter is that they bear less directly 
011 the ground over nhich the besieger will adrance, and that they are 
liEely to be enfiladed from the salient ton-arcls the shoulders. Wlien a work 
occqics n re-entering position in the general line, so that the prolongations of 
tile front ditch oinnot be taken tip by tlie enemy, tlie straight trace lins ever?-- 
tiling to recommend it. For one thing, its caponier may be placed at one end 
ilEtead of in the middle, and mill be able to defend also the adjoining flank, 
tllercby sxvinw D slioulder-cnponier (as in the case of Fort Purbrook, 
1’]3~1 of whicllbis given iit vol. xii of this Journal). This \viU also d lon  snc l~  
time to bc adopted in cases where one only of the prolongations lies 
out of the enemy’s rcacli. But Brialmont himself recognizes that tlic front 
must be broken outwards \rliencrer the enemy could otherwise place batteries 
SO ,as to breach the caponier by firing along the ditch. The forts of a camp- 
fortress must .as n rulc be snlient rorks,  and their d i e n c y  increases as the 
inter\ds between them arc inado wider. Even if the siege batteries arc not 
strictly on the prolongation of tlic ditch, but 10” or 15’ outside of it, their 
shot will still drop sufficiently after clearing the glacis to strike tho m‘zsonq- 
of the mponier. So fnr as the cscarp liiie is concerned, therefore, it  secms 
likely that ‘as breacliing by curved fire becomcs niorc perfect tlic :mgIc 
between the faces, instead of being incrcmed to 180”, will commonly have to 
be made less obtuse tlian hitherto ; and if this makes tlie fire of the two faces 
too dirergent, or exposes them too seriously to enfilade in the opposite 
direction, some part of then1 must bc traced independently of the escarp. 
I n  some mses, as in the type given by Jlajor Wagner, of tlie Prussinn 
Engineers (Atis ,  xviii, 20), secondary flanks ‘arc provided, firing to the right 
and left rear, so tliat the work fronts three-quarters of n circlc, and the gorge 
is nnrrowed. In very snlient positions sucli n forni is imperatire, and even for 
the ordinary forts of n chain i t  has the adrmtagc that, when their iieighbours 
have fallen, and tlie enemy puslies in through tlic gap, they themselres omnot 
so easily be taken in  rkir, aiid are better ablc to support n retrenchment line. 
But these secondary flariks are tliernselves so exposed torer-erse fire, that tliey 
need to bc protected by pamdos, or to be completely ascmated. Tliey help 
to hide the kecp, Then tlierc is one, as in this instance, from the enemy’s 
view ; but that seem n questionable adnntngc, m they correspondingly 
restrict its action. 
The ncn~ Frencli and German forts hare been made without keeps, on 
account of the difficulty already mentioned of making tlieni effective for their 
)urpose, and at the same time sheltering them sufficiently from cur\ ed fire. 
!‘They restrict the interior spacc,” says Najor Brunncr, “and intercept tlie 
sliells which fly orer the parapet of the work, so tliat they are liable to be 
disnbled along Kith it. Conseqnentl>- their serrices are not alxmys iu pro- 
portion to their cost.”’ Another Austrian \Triter says : “Although keeps can 
be protected from curved fire in the same ~ a y  as thc main rork,  it must be 
rcmcmbered that the kcc has usually no action upon the ground outside, 
and that if once the outer {nc of the fort is carried, the pushing forn-ard of an 
attack step by step on the keep, though it presents difIiculties and occupies 
men, ~ m s e s  no serious hindrnce to tlie progress of the athck against adjoin- 
ing works, or a3iinst tlie nucleus?* 
“To renonncc n kecp,” 
s a p  Xrqncr, “~vould be 3s incorrect as to fight in the field 3-ithout 
rcsen-es.”J He endearours to adapt the old Prusian type of keep to present 
conditions, retaining men the oascniates for Iiigli-anglc fire. Instead of over- 
Rut other writers still insist on their importance. 
‘‘ Bcsthdige Befestigung,” p. 69. 
Wecger and Geldern, ‘‘ Xefcstigungskunst ’’ (1S73), ii, 36. 
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lapping the gorge ditch, it  must no\\- be pushed forward into the interior of 
the work, and its escwp covered by an inner glacis. I t s  p la t fop  must not 
be giren any command orer the main rampart, but one or more iron turreb 
may be placed on it, to fire indirectly upon the country. 
Urialmont maintains that “ n keep is an indispensable work for every impor- 
tantfort\rliicli is either isolated, or in asalient position.”’ It is not really costly, 
for i t  furnishes the csemated corer viliicli must needs be provided in Some 
form, and by tl\e additional security it gives, it  may even allow of n reduction 
i n  the height of the main esmrp and coanterscq. Tlie space it occupies is 
weless for any other purpose, and it does not necessarily involve any enlarge. 
ment of tlie fort. If properly constructed, instead of falling with the fort, it  
will impose n second siege on the enemy, and mill mennwliile arrest his further 
xd\-ance ; for, d i k e  Wagner, Brialmont makes it an cssentid condition that 
the keep should overlap tlie gorge ditch, and while screened from the front by 
the main rampart, should be able to command the countq- on either flank as 
xell ‘as to  the rear. H e  d\rells upon the value of the keep, not only in 
guarding a fort against sudden capture by assault, but also in  supporting 
counterstrokes for its recovery when the enemy ha\-e got possession of it. 
With this contingency in view, lie noriltl make x-ide rondn-ays across tlie 
gorge ditch and rampart, close under the guns of tlie keep, to allon tlie fresh 
troops to enter the nork. 
Since he wrote, a marked instance in support of his argument lias been 
furnished by the storming of Kan. Wlien the Russians had made themselves 
m,asters of Fort Ranly, the fire from its keep, :t defensible bzrrzck, obliged 
them to abandon tlie interior, and get corer outside the parapet. It enabled 
the Turks to reoccupy the work for n time, and when they liad retired tlie 
keep still held out, until all the xl-orks on tliat side of tlie river had siir- 
rendered, and i t   as plain that further resistance was useless. I t  must be 
remembered, too, that Fort Kanly, like tlie other southern forts, had been 
Tigorously bombartlecl with siege guns for a neck before the ,assault. 
Tlie main problem in fort bidding-hor; to organize the ramparts and 
dispose the armament, so ‘as to deal either x-itli the. con\-erging fire of 
numerous siege batteries, or nitli sudden ,%snults by orernlielming forces- 
meets nitli widely different solutions. In most of the German forts, as 
already mentioned, reliance is placed chiefly upon tlie use of high cm-ringcs, 
and of massive and frequent trnrei-ses. There is only a single rampart, on 
wliicli tlic heavy pns  are mounted for indirect fire during the artillery 
combat, and wliicli serves for infantry, or for tlic liglitcr guns firing orcrbank 
d i e n  the enemy comes near. In the French forts there are t n o  ramparts, n 
Ion-cr one for infantry, and n higher one behind i t  for artillery, so that 600 
rifles and about 30 guns cm be brought into play a t  once. This arrangement 
is said to hare been adopted also by the Germans in some of their latest 
works, but Brialmont condemns it becmse tlie infantry ~\-ould suffer so mucli 
from shells bursting in the exterior slope of the rampart in their rear. H e  
himself recommends an inner rampart for tlie lien\-y guns, but it. is loner 
than the outer rampart, and screened by it from tlie eneniy’s T&K.~ I n  large 
forts with keeps, this inner rampart dionld be broken into two h a l r ~ ,  
separated by the keep, which slionld flank them both in  front and rear ; 111 
sniall forts i t  \\-ill form a continnous retrenchment or parados for the gorge 
parapet. 
An interior battcry of tlih kind has been adopted in the latest Englisli tJJX? 
of fort (See $ 2.92, Part I of the Woolwicli “Test-lmok of Fortificntion”). 
“D6fen~c des Etnts,” p. 185. 
Grncral Todleben carried out some experiments in 1825, which led liim to  the 
conclusion tliat, as indirect laying must in any case be lnrge?y emplorecl in future, 
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Tile crest is about GO yards behind the outer p:rrapet, and lialf a yard below 
it, and the exterior slope is very gentle, so that $hells striking it may ricochet 
Over the work. The outer rampart is intended only for musketry and field- 
oL1m, with a few heavy guns on Xoucrieff carriages a t  tlie angles. 
I n  tlie newest Austrian designs, given in the magnificent collection of 
details of militnry architecture recently published,’-n collection to which one 
,s-ould much like to see some English parallel-we also meet with interior 
batteries, with their crest 011 the sanie level as the outer crest, or a f e n  inches 
higher. The ends hnve a 
masonry esmrp screened by au inner glacis, and they form orillom covering 
the flanks of the keep, which have a good view over the country upon the 
sides, and in rear of, the fort. The front h‘xs only a steep earthen slope, 
with an unflanked paliside at  its bse.  
~ r o n  turrets and sliiclds Iiave been made iise of tb some extent abroac~ for 
i i i lad works .w wcll as for  co‘ast batteries. The carliest turret mounted 011 
larid was on the keep of oiie of tlie Antwerp forts, and some of the n e w  forts 
a t  Metz are provided with two turrets each. Tlie cost h,u been brought down 
low as 4,0001. for a two-5in turret ; and Crunner points out that a fort 
%-it11 ten sucli turrets mill even be clieapcr than n fort for twenty unarmoured 
guns, on account of its much snialIer size. But the uncerhinty of ‘artillery 
progress makes it unsafe to stake much on them, and so they stand on the 
footing of defensive luxuries, additions to works which are not dependent 
upon them, but for which no money is grudged. It is said that there are not 
Inore tlian a dozcn turrets in tlic whole of the fortresses of Germany. They 
are chiefly to be used, according to Wagner, for giving protection from curved 
fire to heavy guns wliich arc hidden from +w-, and arc themselves to be laid 
indnectly, as on the keep of the fort referred to above. 
I n  the Frcncli forts iron hxs been more largely used, shields being provided 
for several g i u ~  on tlie ramparts. Shields give a mucli more restricted field 
of fire tlian turrets, and their ports cannot be ax-erted from tlie enemy xhen 
not in use ; but they cost niucli les ,  and it is cnsier to increase tlieir thickness 
if it should bccome iiecesiq- at any time, supposing that they are made of 
plates bolted together. It is a gmi t  drawback to the chilled cast-iron 
(G.rusoii’s patent) nliich is now being so largely ado )ted abroad, both for 
dnelds aid turrets, that it  will hardly admit of any sucfi subsequent strengtli- 
ening. 
“ A  great step will have been made,’’ sip Brialmont, “ when some one has 
invented a disappeuing carriage of simple construction and moderate cost, 
which mill allom of fire over a parapet a b u t  10 feet The BIoncrieff 
countern-eight arr iage does not seem to be accepted abroad as satisfying the 
essential conditions. Looking upon this as too expensive and too liable to 
injury, but nisliing to obtain its advantages of shelter an71 all-round fire, 
Count Geldern, of the Austrian Enginecrs, proposes to use lifting platform9 
working spirally in circular pits. H e  lins given a design for n T-shaped fort, 
to mount s is  liemy guns in p ib  upon the head, and six field-guns on tlie flanks. 
Cornparing i t  with an ordinary lunette armed with sel-enteen heavy guns and 
four field-gum, he shows that in most directions i t  will be able to bring more 
gum to bear, while in tlie cost of construction and in the stren$li of the 
garrison needed for it, there will be n siving of nearly 40 per cent. Apart 
from the question of tlie mechiinism, this design, if not quite satisfactory for 
an independent work, lins much to recommend it for n keep. 
I n  the several types of forts that have been mentioned there is little difference 
.w regards tlie flank defence of the ditch, with the exception of the one just 
iioticed, in which countelscarp casemates are employed. A 1  the others have 
1 ‘‘ Snmmlung Ton Constructions-Details der Iiriegsbnukunst, lithogmpliirt ~ I I I  
VOL. XXYI. S 
D 
In one &uc the battery forms part of a keep. 
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m a l l  one-tier aponieis, placed where they are lcnst exposed to fire along the 
ditch, sunk suficiently to be slicltercd froiii sliots descending a t  15’ from the 
crest of the glacis, and projecting beyond the escarp only so far <as ivil.1 afford 
space for two guns or half-a-dozen muskets. Tlie space necessary IS more 
narrody reckoned in some cnscs than in otlicrs, in order to lessen a-5 much as 
possible the retirement of the eounterscirp opposite the mponieis, whicli- 
unless the glacis is rciised correspoiidingly-nil1 make it ensier for  the enemy 
to lircich t l i e lescq  there. A gun mu be worked in n width of 9 feet, and 
n mitmillenr in less ; and iron columns can be used, iustead of brick n-alls 
to carry the roof; so tliat the projection of tlie caponier may be reduced 
to about 20 feet. But that gives rery little room for the dehchments, and 
Iiardly admits of loopholes for musketry in addition to the gunports. A width 
of 13 feet (4 m.) for the gunrooms is more convenient, and has been adopted 
in the mponiers of the French forts. Iron ciponiers have been provided for 
R few German works where it nas not possible to screen m‘asonry from cun-ed 
fire. Apart from their greater resistance when struck, they Gin be better 
eorered by the glacis, as their total height from the gun-floor need only be 
about 10 feet instead of 20 feet. With wide n e t  ditches like those of the 
Antwerp forts, iron, a t  all events in the form of shields, seem indispensable 
for the cnponieiy. 
.hIitraillcurs, if they can be relied upon not to get out of order, are more 
effective for flanking ditches than either y n s  or  musketry ; and they take 
up l e s  space tlian guns, and require fewer men to serve them. Tlie French 
linre adopted for the new Paris forts a pattern of the Hotchkiss 5-barrelled 
revolving gun, which h‘as n cilibre of 1’57 inches, and fires n cise-shot con- 
taining 24 liardened bullets of I$ oz. each. “Tlie p i  is sighted and fixed 
once for all in  tlie caponier, so that, in n surprise during day or night, it  is 
only necesary to turn the crank, and th‘e gun will discharge GO to 60 canister 
shots per minute, consisting of 1,500 to 2,000 bnlls.” The central ciponiers 
of tliese forts hare three gunrooms on eaeli flank, and as their size exposes 
them to curved fire, the front walls of the ynrooms are masked by carrying 
the arches fonvard about 20 feet beyond them. The cnsemates in  the head of 
the capoilier ‘are also extended Iaternlly, and form orillons sheltering tlie flanks, 
so that the plan reminds one of the e.arly Italinu bnstions. 
Brialmont, mliile adopting “minimum cnponieis ” in ordinary cases, eon- 
siders tLit forts intended to resist n systematic attack to the very last ought 
to have large ciponiers witli wide gunrooms protected by masks ; and lie 
would give them ox-erlapping lieads with acute sdients, like those of the 
Antnerp forts, so that they mn be flankctl from the ramparts. 
The heads of the French and German caponiers are iinflankcd, and defended 
only by tlieir own loopliolea, nhicli in the cxe  of the forrger are macliicolatcd. 
There are connterscarp galleries opposite to tliem, but tliese are solely for 
countermining, and are not loopholed, according to Brialmont. As they linre 
no underground commumicition with the fort, but open into the ditch, it  is 
nssiimed-surely a very questionable assumption-tliat rncn would not stay ill 
them, and that loopholes would be useful only to thc enemy. No doubt aiip 
reverse defence is likely to fail sooner or later in case of a regular siege, but, 
as has often been remarked, n fortress has done its chief duty when once it 
lins compelled tlie enemy to besiege i t  in form. With detached forts 
especially, it  is assmlt that it is of most im ortance to be absolutely secure 
against ; attempts on the cnponieis-to blin! tlie looplioles, blow in part of 
the walk, or smoke out the defenders, nould be the accompaniment of any 
nssnult, and noultl lnrgely influence its suecess ; and it seems rery desirable 
to supplement mere direct defence in some way, for the head as nell as for tlie 
flanks. 
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a geiieral pee- 
dilection for those modes of attack mhich promised to give escape from a 
re,rmlar siege. But this has lessened with discussion, and consequently the 
formation of rules for the coIjduct of the sxstematic attack has been recently 
hken up  n i th  zeal.” Strenuous advocates of the more rapid methods are, 
however, still to be found. The second part of 3Iajor Scheibert’s xrork, pub- 
lished in 1881, “ Die Befestipngskunst wid die Lehre vom Kampfe,” is little 
else than a vinorous argument in favour of storming the new French frontier 
fortresses on 8ie outbreak of another n a c  
I n  some nay  or other a place must be gotpossession of if it  blocks the main 
artery upoii which the very life. of an invading army now depends, and this, 
he argues, ought to be done within three weeks from the beginning of 110s- 
tilities. But the regular siege of a grcat modern fortress will occupy from 
three to six months-the duration of a war in tliesc days. Ths fortress is a t  
its m d e s t  when the enemy first conies before it, and the morc proiiiptly a:d 
vigorous1.y it is attacked the less are the chances of the defence. The garrison- 
sure, as Von Scherff says. to consist of second-rate troops-half organized and 
new to their work, will n-arrant bold measures against it. If tlie assailants 
wait t o  fortify an investment line, and bring up a siege train, each day’s delay 
will improre the state of the garrison, and of their works. With an ej-c 
especially to Verduit and Toul (of n-hich he gives sketches), he dwells upon the 
‘wide intervals between the French forts, and the impossibility of amiing and 
fortifying these iiiteri-als, and of clearing away the ruasscs of rood in their 
front aiid rear, in the fortnight which there would be for preparation before 
the German armies appeared. A certain French fortress (Verdun l )  has n 
garrison of 29,000 infantry. Of these, 9,000 are required for the forts and 
enceinte, and 6,000 to furnish outposts and p a r d  the intervals on the further 
side ; leaving only 14,000 for the same purpose on the side attacked, or one 
man to 1.5 m2tres. It xrould be an easy niatter, lie concludes, for the as- 
sailants to break through the intervals a t  once, especially under corer of night 
or mist, to establish themselves tliere firmly, aiid either push forward directly 
upon the ton-n, or assault some of the more isolated forts a t  the gorge while 
attacking them at  the Lime time in front. The front faces will have about 14 
hea5-y guns and 250 infantry to oppose such an attack. To keep donil their 
fire, 1,250 ii1fantl.y can be hastily intrenched witliin tCO mitres, acd can be 
xvcll supported by field artillery. These ought to inake it impossible for the 
gunners of the forts to serve their guns. 
Ca- 
ponieis are lield in too much awe. It is quite 1:osibblc to clcsc upon them, 
and to blind their ports and loopholes ; and kcsides, men nhcn firing through 
looplioles in m‘asoiiry are by no ineans tliernselvcs sccurc from fire, and their 
ckfcndeis, few and isolated, are likely to think more of their on-n sifety thaii 
of their duty. But if escilade seem to be impracticable a lodgnelit must be 
11:ade upori the glacis, aid mining or heavy guns iniist I;c cmployed to get lid 
of the obstacles in the ditch. 
From tlie point of view of tlie atta’ck Najor Sclieibert’s arguments, and the 
esperience of recent s i e p  to which lie appeals are rcry far from convincing ; 
but from the point of \-ley of the defence tlicy arc worth bearing in mind. 
“A little while ago,” sap  Colonel Muller,l “there 
Escnlade is not so difficult n thing, in liis opinion, as people suppose. 
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